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The Speech Act of Swearing:
Gregory of Nazianzus’s Oath
in Poema 2.1.2 in Context
SUZANNE ABRAMS REBILLARD
Gregory of Nazianzus’s Poemata de seipso as a group are labeled “autobiography” erroneously. 2.1.2 provides a strong case study: it is formally structured
as an oath, to be sworn by a bishop but with no definitive identification of
speaker. As an oath it is well suited to the application of speech act theory,
which allows for interpretations with Gregory and/or any orthodox bishop
as speaker. When further considered in light of other oaths as compositional
models—professional (e.g. Hippocratic), magisterial, imperial loyalty, biblical—
the poem’s scope expands beyond the “autobiographer” to encompass the
episcopate and fourth-century culture more broadly.

In the wake of the dissolution of Lejeune’s coalescence of author, narrator, and protagonist as a generic norm of autobiography, labeling a text as
such introduces a host of complications for interpretation and approach.1
Precarious as the relationship is between authors and texts of modern
autobiography, it is even more so with regard to the early texts so labeled
anachronistically and claimed retrospectively to mark the beginning of
the Western tradition of self-composed lives of great men. The Poemata
de seipso of Gregory of Nazianzus, having been identified as autobiography, are paradigmatic of the difficulties one encounters.2 The poems, and
The initial research for this article was conducted thanks to a fellowship from the
Program in Hellenic Studies at Princeton University.
1. Philippe Lejeune, “The Autobiographical Contract,” in French Literary Theory
Today, ed. Tzvetan Todorov (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 193.
2. Following PG 37:969–1452: Liber II. Poemata Historica. Sectio I. De seipso
(cited here as 2.1.x). The title is given to a volume of translations: Carolinne White,
trans., Gregory of Nazianzus: Autobiographical Poems, Cambridge Medieval Classics 6 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The term is also applied
Journal of Early Christian Studies 21:2, 177–207 © 2013 The Johns Hopkins University Press
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e specially the extensive De vita sua, have long been regarded as revolutionary in their intimacy. They consequently have been read with assumptions
of transparency and authorial truth in attempts to revivify a fascinating
figure and to reconstruct the specific historical context in which he wrote.
Gregory’s corpus, however, more often than not provides its own contexts
for verification: there is very little corroborating evidence not written
by Gregory about the events or the “personality” described therein. For
many of the ninety-nine “Autobiographical Poems” in particular, the only
evidence of compositional context for an individual poem and historical
context(s) of the event narrated is internal. Moreover, these widely diverse
poems are comprised not only of narratives, but prayers, curses, charms,
invective, and epitaphs as well, and the conception of them as a collection
about the poet himself derives primarily from an eighteenth-century editorial construct based in great part on their common first-person voice.3 If
Gregory as autobiographer retreats, whose voice do we hear?
Publication within the last thirty years of the first critical editions of
these poems and of their translation into modern languages has allowed
historians greater access to Gregory’s supposedly personal and introspective but complex writings, and they have discovered what seems to be a
symphony of evidence about the man and the fourth century. Yet as Brian
Daley sagely advises in the introduction to his recent volume of transla-

to the poems by Francis Gautier in his La retraite et le sacerdoce chez Grégoire de
Nazianze, Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, Sciences Religieuses 114 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), Part 2, Chapter 3: “L’autobiographie chez Grégoire,” 214–41;
and Francesco Trisoglio, “Il Carme II,1,1 di S. Gregorio Nazianzeno: tra rievocazione
storica e trasfigurazione poetica,” in Motivi e forme della poesia cristiana antica tra
scrittura e tradizione classica, 36 Incontro di studiosi dell’antichità cristiana, Roma, 3–5
maggio 2007, Studia ephemeridis “Augustinianum” 108 (Roma: Institutum patristicum
Augustinianum, 2008), 259–72. Hence circular arguments in attempts to reconstruct
the personality of the author, such as Ugo Criscuolo, “Sugli ‘epigrammi’ di Gregorio
di Nazianzo,” in L’epigramma greco: problemi e prospettive, Atti del congresso della
Consulta Universitaria del Greco, Milano, 21 ottobre 2005, ed. Giuseppe Lozza and
Stefano Martinelli Tempesta (Milan: Cisalpino, 2007), 19–52.
3. Contra the argument by the poem’s editors that the collection could be traced
to Gregory himself, who edited it with the help of a “secretary”: Guillaume Bady,
Jean Bernardi, and André Tuilier, ed. and trans., Saint Grégoire de Nazianze, O
 euvres
poétiques, Tome 1, Première partie, Poèmes personnels II, I, 1–11, Collection des
Université de France, Série grecque 433 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2004), lxxiii–lxxviii.
On Gregory as editor of his own letters, see Ep. 52 (ed. and trans. Paul Gallay, Saint
Grégoire de Nazianze, Correspondance, 2 vols., 2nd ed. [Paris: Les Belles Lettres,
2003], 1:68–69) and Gallay’s introduction to the letters (Correspondance, 1:xx–xxiii);
and Neil McLynn, “Gregory the Peacemaker: A Study of Oration Six,” Kyoyo-Ronsio
101 (1996): 183–216.
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tions: “In reading his works, we must thread our way carefully through
the details of Gregory’s emotional, dramatic, often self-justifying presentation of himself, to try to discover the man, the priest, the theologian, as
others in his day might have known him.”4 There is a growing body of
scholarship on the rhetorical, philosophical, and literary contexts, particularly classical and biblical, that informed Gregory’s poetic habit, but
there has been little consideration of non-literary and perhaps even more
mundane influences.5
This paper is a case study of the second of Gregory’s Poemata de seipso
(2.1.2), an attempt to reveal what many of these so-called autobiographical
pieces offer beyond a positivist quest for Gregory as subject. There is no
thorough—or even cursory, so far as I am aware—treatment of this poem
in the scholarship. The discussion below begins with an identification of
Poema 2.1.2 as a formal oath concerning proper performance of the episcopal office and consideration of the problems related to dating the poem.
Faced with numerous uncertainties, specifically the ambiguous nature of
the poem’s opening aorist, the study turns to speech act theory, an obvious theoretical framework given the poem’s formal structure, to discover
what the poem can offer in lieu of an attempt to discover specifics about
the author. This approach allows for a double reading: with Gregory as
subject and without. This interpretive route is then pursued further in an
4. Brian E. Daley, S.J., Gregory of Nazianzus, The Early Church Fathers (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 2; emphasis mine.
5. The most recent contributions to the bibliography appear in Christopher Beeley,
ed., Re-reading Gregory of Nazianzus, Essays on History, Theology, and Culture, CUA
Studies in Early Christianity (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America
Press, 2012), which appeared too late for me to take into account in this article. See
(selectively): Bradley K. Storin, “In a Silent Way: Asceticism and Literature in the Rehabilitation of Gregory of Nazianzus,” JECS 19:2 (2011): 225–57; Jean Paul Lieggi, La
cetra di Cristo, le motivazioni teologiche della poesia di Gregorio di Nazianzo (Rome:
Herder Editrice, 2009); Christos Simelidis, Selected Poems of Gregory of Nazianzus, I.2.17; II.1.10, 19, 32: A Critical Edition with Introduction and Commentary,
Hypomnemata, Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem Nachleben 177 (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009); the contributions on Gregory in Motivi e forme,
281–412; Jostein Børtnes and Tomas Hägg, ed., Gregory of Nazianzus: Images and
Reflections (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2006); Kristoffel Demoen, Pagan
and Biblical Exempla in Gregory Nazianzen: A Study in Rhetoric and Hermeneutics,
Corpus Christianorum, Lingua patrum 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996). Exceptions are:
Dayna Kalleres, “Demons and Divine Illumination: A Consideration of Eight Prayers
by Gregory of Nazianzus,” VC 61:2 (2007): 157–88; and Susanna Elm, “Inventing
the ‘Father of the Church’: Gregory of Nazianzus’ ‘Farewell to the Bishops’ (Or. 42)
in its Historical Context,” in Vita Religiosa im Mittelalter, Festschrift für Kaspar Elm
zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Franz J. Felten and Nikolas Jaspert, Berliner historische Studien 31, Ordensstudien 13 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999), 3–20.
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examination of the poem within the context of Gregory’s wider attitude
to swearing. Finally, possible extra-biographical compositional contexts
are identified and explored in an investigation of oath types that could
have been models for 2.1.2, to suggest that the poem might be read as a
professional oath or oath of office for bishops, a doctrinal loyalty oath,
or a judicial oath of self-defense, rather than simply as a record of an oath
sworn by the illusive “Gregory the man.”
I provide here my translation of the entire poem, without a title and
with alternative verbs in brackets for reasons discussed below.
I swear [swore] on the very Logos, who for me is greatest God,
source from source, of the immortal Father,
image of the archetype, a nature its begetter’s equal,
who descended even into human existence from heaven;
I swear [swore] I will [would] not, diabolically minded, cast off the
Great Mind
with heretic mind, nor the Word with heretic word.
If I should sunder the divinity of the luminous Trinity,
hearkening to the will of this inimical age;
if the great seat should ever goad my mind to madness,
or should I lay on my hand with heretical desire;
if I should prefer a mortal guardian to God,
securing my line to a weak rock;
if I should ever have a haughty spirit in good fortune,
or confronted with ills, conversely fall feeble;
if feigning righteousness I should dispense a justice somehow skewed;
if the supercilious should receive my esteem before the holy;
if seeing the base somehow at peace or crags on the route of the noble
I should veer from the right path;
if envy should dissolve my spirit; if I should mock
the stumbling of another, even one unholy, as if holding my own
step secure;
if my mind should collapse with tumid anger, and if unbridled
my tongue race and my heart turn a wanton eye;
if I should hate someone fruitlessly, and if I should punish
my enemy stealthily or even openly;
if from my home I should dismiss a beggar empty-handed,
or a spirit still thirsting for a heavenly word;
may Christ attend another more gently, but as for my efforts,
even up to my white hairs, may the breeze take them.
By these laws I bind [bound] my existence. And should I achieve
the fulfillment of my desire, Eternal Christ, thanks be to you.6

5
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6. Unless noted, all translations of Gregory’s poetry here are my own. The edition followed here is Bady, Bernardi, and Tuilier, Poèmes personnels, 44–45: Ὤμοσα
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FORMAL STRUCTURE and dating
In Carmelo Crimi’s 1999 translation, Poema 2.1.2 is titled “Giuramento
di Gregorio,” from the PG’s Ὅρκοι Γρηγορίου, which itself follows the
tradition of de Billy and the Maurist editors whose text Migne adopted.7
Only one of the eighteen manuscripts in which the poem appears with a
title contains ὅρκοι. Jean Bernardi’s French translation of the poem in the
first critical edition of the piece is titled “Règles de vie,”8 from Ὅροι βίου,
the title most common in the manuscripts and in manuscript L, which the
textual editors, André Tuilier and Guillaume Bady, deem the most reliable.9 We have no indication whether and/or how Gregory himself titled
the poem.
The difference in title begs the question of whether the piece is an actual
oath or a more general statement. In addition to its opening word, “I swear
[swore],” structurally the poem is an oath. It adheres to a traditional tripartite formula comprised of an initial swearing naming the object by which
one swears, a curse, and a closing describing the conditions governing the
reception of the curses.10
τὸν Λόγον αὐτόν, ὅ μοι Θεός ἐστι μέγιστος, / ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, Πατρὸς ἀπ’ ἀθανάτου, /
εἰκὼν ἀρχετύποιο, φύσις γεννήτορος ἴση, / ὃς φθάσε καὶ μερόπων ἐς βίον οὐρανόθεν, /
ὤμοσα μήτε νόῳ γε νόον μέγαν, ἐχθρὰ νοήσας, / ῥίψειν μήτε λόγῳ τὸν Λόγον ἀλλοτρίῳ. /
Εἰ Τριάδος θεότητα διατμήξαιμι φαεινῆς, / ἐσπόμεος καιρῶν νεύμασιν ἀντιπάλων· / εἰ
δ’ ἕδρη μεγάλη ποτ’ ἐμὸν νόον οἰστρήσειεν, / ἠὲ πόθῳ δοίην ἀλλοτρίω παλάμην· / εἰ δὲ
θεοῦ προπάροιθε βροτὸν θείμην ἐπίκουρον, / πέτρης ἠπεδανῆς πείσματ’ ἀναψάμενος· / εἰ
δέ ποτ’ ἐσθλὰ φέροντος ἀγήνορα θυμὸν ἔχοιμι, / ἠὲ κακοῖς κύρσας, ἔμπαλιν ἀδρανέα· / εἰ
δὲ δίκην δικάσαιμι παρακλίνας τι θέμιστος, / εἰ δὲ λάβοι τιμὴν ὀφρὺς ὕπερθ’ ὁσίων· / εἰ δὲ
κακοὺς ὁρόων τι γαληνιόωντας ὁδοῖο / σταίην δεξιτερῆς, ἢ ἀγαθῶν σκοπέλους· / εἰ φθόνος
ἐκτήξειεν ἐμὴν φρένα· εἰ γελάσαιμι / πτῶμα καὶ οὐχ ὁσίων, ὡς πόδα πηγὸν ἔχων· / εἰ δὲ
χόλῳ πλήθοντι πέσοι νόος, εἰ δ’ ἀχάλινος / γλῶσσα θέοι, μάχλον τ’ ὄμμα φέροι κραδίη· / εἰ
δέ τιν’ ἐχθαίροιμι μάτην, εἰ δ’ ἐχρθὸν ἐμεῖο / τισαίμην δολίως, ἠὲ καὶ ἀμφαδίην· / εἰ κενεὴν
πέμψαιμι δόμων ἄπο χεῖρα πένητος, / εἰ φρένα διψαλέην οὐρανίοιο λόγου· / ἄλλῳ Χριστὸς
ἔοι πλέον ἵλαος, αὐτὰρ ἐμεῖο / τοὺς ἄχρι καὶ πολιῆς αὖρα φέροι καμάτους. / Τοῖσδε νόμοισιν
ἔδησα ἐμὸν βίον. Εἰ δὲ πόθοιο / ἐς τέλος ἱκοίμην, ἄφθιτε, σεῖο χάρις.
7. Carmelo Crimi and Ivano Costa, ed. and trans., Gregorio Nazianzeno: Poesie/2,
Collana di testi patristici 150 (Rome: Città Nuova, 1999), 66.
8. Bady, Bernardi, and Tuilier, Poèmes personnels, 44–45.
9. The edition lists twenty-six mss. containing the poem and relies on nineteen, one
missing lines 1–19 (Parisinus gr. 993, f. 7–144, 168–230; Bady, Bernardi, and Tuilier,
Poèmes personnels, cxcviii, ccvii). Ὅροι βίου is also the title in Nicetas David’s ninthcentury commentary (ed. Ernst Dronke, S. Gregorii Nazianzeni, Carmina selecta.
Accedit Nicetae Davidis paraphrases nunc primum e codice Cusano edita [Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1840], 114, note to line 3). Note that Gregory uses the word
νόμοι in the closing couplet to refer to the “rules” he lays down in the poem, not ὅροι.
10. George Wesley Buchanan (“Some Vow and Oath Formulas in the New Testament,” HTR 58 [1965]: 321–22) offers the same tripartite definition. The d
 efinition
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1. Lines 1–6: The speaker tells of having sworn/swearing an oath to Christ
that he will/would not think or speak heretically.
2. Lines 7–28: He presents fourteen conditions for fidelity to the oath,
followed by the penalty (lines 27–28) should he prove faithless—Christ
will direct his care to others while the poet’s efforts remain without
consequence.
3. Lines 29–30: He reiterates that this was his oath with a positive
statement of condition and reward—if he is successful, he will give
thanks to Christ.

The poem is clearly about the episcopate, not just general rules for
Christian life. There is a reference to the “great seat,” ἕδρη μεγάλη, in line
9, which both translators interpret as the episcopal throne. In line 15,
the poem makes reference to audientia episcopalis in the dispensing of
justice. Line 10 is a reference to the laying on of hands in the ordination
of priests and/or consecration of bishops.11 Πόθῳ ἀλλοτρίῳ is translated
here as instrumental dative, providing Gregory’s motive; ἀλλοτρίῳ, literally “alien,” is construed as “heretical” given that the preceding, and first,
element of the self-cursing is about proper interpretation of the Trinity.12
The promise is to perform only orthodox ordinations.

found in Alan H. Sommerstein and Judith Fletcher, ed., Horkos: The Oath in Greek
Society (Exeter: Bristol Phoenix Press, 2007), 2, differs, but is also tripartite and all
three of its elements are in 2.1.2: a declaration, a calling on divinity, a self cursing. For
a wider definition, see Alan H. Sommerstein, “Cloudy Swearing: When (if ever) is an
Oath not an Oath?” in Sommerstein and Fletcher, Horkos, 125–37; Robert F. O’Toole,
“Acts 2.30 and the Davidic Covenant of Pentecost,” JBL 102 (1983): 250–54; and
Kevin Uhalde, Expectations of Justice in the Age of Augustine (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 77–104. On the distinction between an oath and
a vow: Johannes Schneider, art. ὀμνύω, TWNT 5 (1990), 177–85, esp. 178n16; Jean
Rudhart, Notions fondamentales de la pensée religieuse et actes constitutifs du culte
dans la Grèce classique, 2nd ed. (Paris: Picard, 1992), esp. 202–12. Now see Judith
Fletcher, Performing Oaths in Classical Greek Drama (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2012) esp. 2–11, which is based in large part on speech act theory.
11. Cf. the use of the same verb with χεῖρα referring to the laying on of hands in
Or. 43.78 (SC 384:298): ἵνα τοῖς τῆς εὐσεβείας συναπέλθῃ ῥήμασι καὶ χειροτονίαις τῶν
γνησιωτάτων αὐτοῦ θεραπευτῶν, τὴν χεῖρα δίδωσι καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα, ὥστε. . . . The word for
hand is different, but note that παλάμη often carries the connotation of a hand used
in violence or at least misdeed, as is the scenario suggested in my translation; cf. e.g.
Epigrams 200.4; 207.4, 213.3, 230.2 (ed. and trans. William R. Paton, The Greek
Anthology, 5 vols., Loeb Classical Library 67–68, 84–86 [New York: G. P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1919, repr. 1993], 2:486, 488, 492, 498).
12. One might argue for a more general interpretation, translating πόθῳ ἀλλοτρίῳ
as an indirect object, as do Crimi (Poesie/2, 66) and Bernardi (Bady, Bernardi, and
Tuilier, Poèmes personnels, 44). However, given the similarity to Or. 43.78, which
also lacks a indirect object for δίδωσι, and the fact that the conjunction linking line
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The poem’s opening word is temporally ambiguous. Verbs of swearing
often appear in the aorist. Ὤμοσα can be either a present, “I swear,” or a
simple past, “I swore.”13 If it is read as a past tense, we must distinguish
between the poem and the oath recorded in it: the compositional context
of the poem is not the same as the “historical” context of the swearing
of the oath. Crimi translates the word as a past tense, making the piece
an historical account, and he notes that others date the poem and oath
together to Gregory’s elevation to the episcopal see of Sasima in 372, a
concurrence that suggests the poem records an oath upon consecration.14
The basis for this dating is the mention of the ἕδρη μεγάλη, but this does
not necessitate that the oath was taken on Gregory’s elevation to Sasima.
Though it was the first see he occupied, he was also the sole acting bishop
of both Constantinople (379–81) and Nazianzus (381–83), as well as
auxiliary bishop to his father in Nazianzus after his refusal to take up
residence in Sasima.15 Though there is evidence of priests swearing oaths

10 with line 9, which concerns the great seat, is ἠὲ, a closer connection than the δὲ
used in other couplets (though recognizing the two are not metrically interchangeable), an interpretation about ordination as a primary responsibility of the bishop is
preferred. Cf. Or. 10.4 (SC 405:324–27) for the purifications of hands in relation to
the duties of a bishop, followed closely by reference to the ordination of Aaron (noted
by Marie-Ange Calvet-Sebasti, ed. and trans., Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 6–12,
SC 405 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1995], 325n5). One of the anonymous readers
for JECS suggested reading the dative as an indirect object with the interesting conclusion that the line refers to making an alliance with a heretic.
13. Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1956), 1938. On the initial verb of swearing in late antique and Byzantine
papyri, see Zola M. Packman, “Still Further Notes on Papyrus Documents with the
Imperial Oath,” ZPE 100 (1994): 207–10, arguing based on the variety of formulae
in Egypt for the difficulty of studying the implications of specific word choices relative
to cultural norms. For other examples of the aorist in oaths, see, e.g., P. Wisc. 1.11,
line 26 (though seventh century; discussed with other examples of early Byzantine
oaths in K. A. Worp, “P. Wisc. I.11: The Oath Formula,” ZPE 45 [1982]: 224–26).
14. Following de Jonge and de Billy via Migne (PG 37:1017; Poesie/2, 66n1).
15. See Gautier’s Retraite et sacerdoce on Gregory’s itinerancy as a bishop. On
Gregory’s election, see Adolf M. Ritter, Das Konzil von Konstantinopel und sein Symbol, Studien zur Geschichte und Theologie des 2. Ökumenischen Konzils, Forshungen
zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 15 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965),
44–53. John McGuckin structures the better part of his biography on Gregory’s clerical positions (Saint Gregory of Nazianzus: An Intellectual Biography [Crestwood,
NY: Saint Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001], 169–203 on Sasima; 234–43 on his call
to Constantinople). It has been assumed that Gregory was “officially” installed in
Constantinople by, e.g., Peter Van Nuffelen (“Episcopal Succession in Constantinople
[381–450 c.e.]: The Local Dynamics of Power,” JECS 18:3 [2010]: 441–42); but for a
questioning of Gregory’s status in the capital, see Neil McLynn, “Moments of Truth:
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of loyalty to their bishops and loyalty to a doctrinal party,16 there is no
evidence to support the assumption of a widespread fourth-century custom of new bishops swearing an oath when consecrated or elevated to a
see.17 Bernardi cautiously notes, “«un haut siège»: l’épiscopat,” without
mentioning elevation, consecration, ceremonial context, or a particular
see; he suggests no date.
Some of the Poemata de seipso refer explicitly to events that are documented in other datable works, though most have only an approximate
date sometime after Gregory left Constantinople in 381. One of the criteria frequently used to date Gregory’s writings has been his responses to
various heresies. The issue of correct Christological doctrine is a central
concern of Poema 2.1.2, not only in the debatable interpretation of “with
heretical desire,” but also on the more secure grounds of the declaration
that summarizes the core issue in the piece (lines 5–6): “I swore I would
not, diabolically minded, cast off the Great Mind18 with heretic mind / nor
the Word with heretic word.”19 Ἀλλότριος is doubly loaded theologically,
meaning “alien” in the sense of alienation of the parts of the Trinity as

Gregory of Nazianzus and Theodosius I,” in From the Tetrarchs to the Theodosians:
Later Roman History and Culture, 284–450 CE, ed. Scott McGill, Christina Sogno,
and Edward Jay Watts (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 218–31;
and “A Self-Made Holy Man: The Case of Gregory Nazianzen,” JECS 6:3 (1998):
475–77 (repr. in McLynn, Christian Politics V).
16. For loyalty oaths to a bishop: on Eudoxius swearing to bind himself to Aetius,
Philost. HE 7.5, 8.4 (ed. Joseph Bidez, Philostorgios. Kirchengeschichte; mit dem
Leben des Lucian von Antiochien und den Fragmenten eines arianischen Historiographen, ed. Friedhelm Winkelmann, GCS 21, 3rd rev. ed. [Berlin: Akademie Verlag,
1981], 83, 106); also Ewa Wipszycka, “Il vescovo e il suo clero. A Proposito di CPR
V 11,” Journal of Juristic Papyrology 22 (1992): 67–81.
17. See ApostConst 8.3 (ed. and trans. Marcel Metzger, Les constitutions apostoliques, Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes, SC 320-329-336, 3 vols.
[Paris: Éditions du Cerf 1987], 3:142): witnesses vouch for the worthiness of the
candidate before voting, but the candidate is passive. In the description of the rite of
episcopal ordination in Paul Bradshaw, Ordination Rites of the Ancient Churches of
East and West (New York: Pueblo Publishing, 1990), 37–57, the ordinand is passive
until performing the Eucharist.
18. Bernardi translates νοῦς in this line as “spirit” (Bady, Bernardi, and Tuilier,
Poèmes personnels, 44n3), but the word is used consistently by Gregory to refer to
God the Father as “mind” and a divine element of humanity. See, e.g., 1.1.1.29 (P.Arc.
1.29 in Claudio Moreschini and David Sykes, St Gregory of Nazianzus’ Poemata
Arcana, Oxford Theological Monographs [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997]);
1.1.4.68 (P.Arc. 4.68), the “world-creating Mind”; 1.1.5.2 (P.Arc. 5.2) the “great
and infinite Mind.”
19. Cf. examples in Hans Hauben, “On the Invocation of the ‘Holy and Consubstantial Trinity’ in Byzantine Oath and Dating Formulas,” ZPE 139 (2002): 158–60.
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well as alien to his conception of orthodox doctrine, hence, “heretic.”20
The poem is Christocentric, addressed to Christ and, given the appellations in its opening lines, a standard definition of Christ’s nature.21 The
Christological language throughout, however, is formulaic in Gregory’s
corpus, appearing in anti-Eunomian works spanning his career as well as
in his later anti-Apollinarian writings.22 The difficulties of arguing for a
period of composition on the grounds of anti-heretical positions both in
Gregory and more generally need not be repeated here.23
Some of the fourteen elements of the self-cursing echo other statements
Gregory makes upon leaving the capital, a strong indication that the
piece was written post-381 or at least was revised into its current form in
that period. There are various similarities with Oration 42, his farewell

20. Cf. Or. 43.30 (SC 384:192–95).
21. Cf. naming lists in Or. 30.17–21, and 31.29–30 (SC 250:260–75, 332–39).
Christopher Beeley puts Gregory’s expression of doctrine in such a context within
the framework of the Eastern creedal tradition (Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity
and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We See Light, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008], 181, 192, 314–16). Listing
is also examined as a rhetorical device by Carla Castelli, “L’esemplarità retorica di
Gregorio di Nazianzo: spunti per una riflessione,” in Approches de la troisième sophistique: hommages à Jacques Schamp, ed. Eugenio Amato et al., Collection Latomus
296 (Brussels: Editions Latomus, 2006), 63–79; and on naming in the metaphorical
argumentation of the Theological Orations, see Kristoffel Demoen, “Metaphor and
the Ancient Trinitarian Debate: Analogical Language in the Theological Orations of
Gregory Nazianzen,” in Faith and Fiction: Interdisciplinary Studies on the Interplay
between Metaphor and Religion, Papers from the 25th LAUD-Symposium of the Gerhard Mercator University of Duisburg on “Metaphor and Religion,” ed. Benjamin
Biebuyck, René Dirven, and John Ries, Duisburger Arbeiten zur Sprach- und Kulturwissenschaft 37 (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1998), 137–53. On proper naming
relative to the Eunomian controversy, see Frederick W. Norris, Lionel Wickham, and
Frederick Williams, ed. and trans., Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning: The Five Theological Orations of Gregory Nazianzen, Supplements to VC 13 (Leiden: Brill, 1991),
53–69, 176–82, and 273–78. Cf. the prayer that opens the consecration ceremony in
ApostConst 8.5 (Metzger, 3:144–48).
22. He does refer in lines 7–8 to the poem as a reaction to severing the Trinity
in his own times. Cf. language on severing the Trinity: 2.1.55.14–15 (PG 37:1400);
1.1.3.47–48 (P.Arc. 3.47–48); Or. 31.33 (SC 250:340–42); cf. e.g. Or. 42.15 (SC
384:80–82) on the unity of the Trinity.
23. “In focusing on Christ’s divinity Gregory is representing what is arguably the
soteriological mainstream of the early Church” (Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the
Trinity, 127; and more generally on the problems of identifying heretics as sparring
partners, 122–28, 285). The problem is clearly stated by Averil Cameron in “The Violence of Orthodoxy,” in Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity, ed. Eduard Iricinschi
and Holger M. Zellentin, Texte und Studien zum antiken Judentum 119 (Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 102–14.
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to the bishops gathered in Constantinople.24 There are also close comparisons with De vita sua, secure in its post-381 dating.25 Poema 2.1.12,
another bitter response to his hostile colleagues in Constantinople, offers
similar standards for episcopal behavior.26 Finally, legal imagery in 2.1.2
(discussed below in greater detail) corresponds with other writings from
post-381: for example, Gregory argues in De vita sua that his opponents
brought charges on the grounds of an obsolete law against the translation
of bishops—Canon 15 of Nicea—to remove him.27
The episcopal focus in 2.1.2 places it post-372, though many of the similarities with proper episcopal behavior overlap with earlier discussions of
the priesthood, for example, Oration 2 from the 360s.28 I would hesitate
24. Bernardi argues that the version of the oration now extant with its harsh critique
was probably not published during his lifetime (ed. and trans. Jean Bernardi, Grégoire
de Nazianze. Discours 42–43, SC 384 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1992], 15–25). Contra
Bernardi, see Susanna Elm, “A Programmatic Life: Gregory of Nazianzus’ Orations 42
and 43 and the Constantinopolitan Elites,” Arethusa 35:3 (2000): 411–27; McLynn,
“Moments of Truth,” 215–16; and Neil McLynn, “The Voice of Conscience: Gregory
of Nazianus in Retirement,” in Vescovi e pastori in epoca Teodosiana: in occasione
del 16 centenario della consecrazione episcopale di S. Agostino, 396–1996: 25 Incontro di studiosi dell’ antichità cristiana, Roma, 8–11 maggio 1996, Part 2: Padri greci
e latini, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 58 (Rome: Institutum Augustinianum,
1997), 299–308. The similarities are: 2.1.2.7, Or. 42.15 (SC 384:80–83); 2.1.2.13,
Or. 42.24 (SC 384:102–7); 2.1.2.19–24, Or. 42.13 (SC 384:76–79); 2.1.2.24, Or.
42.20 (SC 384:90–95).
25. 2.1.2.17–18, 2.1.11.1146, 1248 (ed. and trans. Christoph Jungck, Gregor von
Nazianz, De vita sua: Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar, Wissenschaftliche
Kommentare zu griechischen und lateinischen Schriftstellern [Heidelberg: C. Winter,
1974], 104, 114); 2.1.2.19–24, 2.1.11.1200 (Jungck: 112); 2.1.11.1218–29 (Jungck:
112–14).
26. 2.1.2.13, 2.1.12.345–48 (ed. and trans. Beno Meier, Gregor von Nazianz, über
die Bishöfe: Carmen 2,1,12, Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar, Studien zur
Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums: Reihe 2, Forschungen zu Gregor von Nazianz 7
[Paderborn: Schöningh, 1989], 48–49); 2.1.2.25, 2.1.12.433–38, 460 (Meier: 52–55);
2.1.2.10, 2.1.12.519–21 (Meier: 58–59); 2.1.2.9, 2.1.12.570 (Meier: 60–61); 2.1.2.25,
2.1.12.309ff (Meier: 46ff).
27. For legalistic formulae, see Elm, “‘Inventing the ‘Father of the Church.’” The
canon seems to be of convenient applicability: Gregory himself later uses the same
argument—his being officially bishop of Sasima—to avoid having to act as bishop
of Nazianzus: Ep. 182 (Gallay, 2:71–72). Van Nuffelen (“Episcopal Succession,”
447), regarding a later event, refers to the canon as being considered a “minor legal
problem,” based on Soc. HE 7.36, 40 (ed. Günther Christian Hansen, Sokrates,
Kirchengeschichte, GCS n.F. 1, 3rd ed., ed. Manja Širinjan [Berlin: Akademie Verlag,
1995], 385–86, 389–90).
28. On the orations on priesthood: Susanna Elm, “The Diagnostic Gaze: Gregory
of Nazianzus’ Theory of Orthodox Priesthood in his Orations 6 De pace and 2 Apologia de fuga sua,” in Orthodoxie, christianisme, histoire / Orthodoxy, Christianity,
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to suggest anything so specific as a period of a few years on theological
grounds as Sykes does for the Arcana,29 but it is reasonable, based on the
concerns, vocabulary, and imagery that echo other post-381 works, to
narrow post-372 to a compositional context (or period of revision—the
formulae and echoes may be due not to a correspondence in period of
composition but to a correspondence in period of revision and compilation) after Gregory’s retreat from Constantinople in 381.
Using Speech Act Theory:
Which context? Whose Intent?
Although Gregory elsewhere in his poetic corpus sketches scenes for quotations of his own speech (whether “real” or fictional), in Poema 2.1.2 he
does not.30 The aorist of the opening verb is ambiguous. The poem focuses
on episcopal behavior, but there is no evidence from the later fourth century
of widespread swearing of episcopal oaths of consecration or otherwise,
with the few exceptions of doctrinal loyalty. A path out of this interpretive thicket can be blazed using speech act theory, which points to what
the poem might accomplish beyond revelations about its author. It allows
us to see what Poema 2.1.2 might do in various proposed contexts and
to consider its numerous possible effects, rather than a hazy “man” or
debatable “truth” about any real oath that he swore.
Austin’s How to Do Things with Words and its internal contradictions have spawned forty years of debate.31 Despite conflicts, however,
all approaches reflect a concern with contexts of performance as basic
to the rudiments of the theory laid by Austin, as well as to John Searle’s
consequent development of the concepts of “network” and “background”

History, ed. Susanna Elm, Eric Rebillard, and Antonella Romano, Collection de l’École
française de Rome 270 (Rome: Ecole française, 2000), 83–100; Gautier, Retraite
et sacerdoce, 113–51 on the priesthood, 302–15 on Or. 2; and Beeley, Gregory of
Nazianzus on the Trinity, 235–70.
29. Moreschini and Sykes, Poemata Arcana, 66–67.
30. See my “The Autobiographical Prosopopoeia of Gregory of Nazianzus,” SP
47 (2010): 123–28.
31. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, The William James Lectures
Delivered at Harvard University in 1955, 2nd ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina
Sbisà (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). For an example of the variety of approaches, see Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo, ed., Essays in Speech
Act Theory, Pragmatics & Beyond, n.s. 77 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing
Company, 2002); or Savas L. Tsohatzidis, ed., Foundations of Speech Act Theory:
Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994).
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( linguistic, intentional, and experiential) that he argues allow a speech act to
communicate meaning.32 Across many shifting definitions and taxonomies,
promising—and consequently swearing oaths—is one of the only speech
acts that has maintained its status as a performative illocutionary act as
Austin initially defined it.33 It is the most common example for the illocutionary commissive chosen by speech act theorists, and thus Poema 2.1.2
with its opening verb of swearing is a tailored fit for the application of
speech act theory.34
This approach offers a resolution to the problem of the opening word’s
ambiguity. If the initial aorist in Poema 2.1.2 is read as a past tense, “I
swore,” the poem is an assertive illocution, and the terms of the oath
should accurately reflect an actual historical swearing.35 If, however, the
opening verb is an aorist of swearing, then the poem is commissive and
binding for any speaker—including Gregory—at any time s/he utters it,
so long as s/he abides by the proper relative extra-linguistic conventions
and has the sincere intent to swear.36 Searle argues that each illocutionary
act is characterized by its direction of fit: the point of the utterance can
be to reflect the world (assertives)—a word to world fit—or to alter the
32. See John Searle, “How Performatives Work,” in Vanderveken and Kubo,
Essays in Speech Act Theory, 85–108. Lace Marie Williams-Tinajero, The Reshaped
Mind: Searle, the Biblical Writers, and Christ’s Blood, Biblical Interpretation Series
104 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), esp. 34–38, beneath its hagiographic approach to Searle’s
work, makes the point clearly.
33. See Austin, How to Do Things, e.g. 9–11.
34. On promises as paradigmatic illocutionary acts, see Antonio Blanco Salgueiro,
“Promises, Threats and the Foundations of Speech Act Theory,” Pragmatics 20:2
(2010): 213–28; Daniel Vanderveken, “Universal Grammar and Speech Act Theory,”
in Vanderveken and Kubo, Essays in Speech Act Theory, 25–62; and it is the primary
example in Searle, “How Performatives Work,” passim. For a literary application,
see Simone Lecointre, “‘Ma langue prêta serment,’ Eur. Hippolyte, vers 612,” in Le
serment, ed. Raymond Verdier, 2 vols. (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1991), 1, “Signes
et fonctions”: 4–22.
35. This does assume an audience of the poem would hear/read it as a record of
an actual event, not as an imaginary oath, an assumption we also must make if our
intent is to use the piece as some kind of historical evidence. By Searle’s arguments, to
label something as an assertive illocution means that truth is a relevant category for
analysis, not that it necessarily is a true reflection of the world: “. . . it is part of the
definition of an assertion that it is a commitment to truth” (John Searle, Consciousness and Language [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 146–47); see
also John Searle, “Illocutionary acts and the concept of truth,” in Truth and Speech
Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, ed. Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart,
Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy 5 (New York: Routledge, 2007), 30.
36. The aorist then functions as the “present present” (a term coined by Julian
Boyd in conversation with and quoted by Searle [“How Performatives Work,” 106]).
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world in order to match the utterance (commissives)—a world to word
fit. Our question about the ambiguity of the opening word of 2.1.2 thus
can be rephrased in terms of fit: Do the poem’s words fit the world or is
the world to fit the words?
The answer is, “Both.” In a chapter devoted to indirect speech acts, or
how it is possible to say one thing and be understood as meaning another,
Searle argues that an utterance can have two illocutionary forces simultaneously, and he distinguishes between a literal and a primary illocutionary
point.37 In the case of our poem, however, it is not clear which reading
of the aorist is primary, the assertive or the commissive. There is double
meaning, but the meanings are of equal primacy. A speaker of 2.1.2 can
perform at least two speech acts with the poem: recalling an oath already
taken and swearing. Moreover, a re-utterance of an oath already sworn is
in essence a re-swearing; and thus the ambiguity of the aorist can be seen
to reinforce an earlier oath’s continuing bond.
The temporal interpretive context is destabilized in the enigmas of the
opening of the text even beyond the assertive/commissive ambiguity. The
assertive aorist states that the speaker swore not to sever Trinitarian divinity or commit any of the other acts listed in the conditional clauses of lines
7–26, but the nature of swearing means the terms established in an unidentified past moment are continuous to the time of narration and/or reading.
The commissive aorist is a promissory note for the future, but this future
is temporally insecure: are we to understand it to start from the time of
writing or from any time the poem is read? The poem’s audience has no
indication of which force is primary and Gregory does not identify himself as the speaker by name or with specific details.38 The poem, speaker,
and audience, as well as the propositional content, are thus transported to
the timeless realm of Christ, significantly identified at the end of the poem
as the Eternal One [Ἄφθιτε].39 Searle argues that a speaker and audience
must have a shared network and background—a mutual understanding
and knowledge of the contexts in which the utterance has meaning—for
a speech act to be successfully performed, but in 2.1.2 there is purposeful
obfuscation by the poet relative to his own identity in place and time that
results in a broadening of possibilities for identification of the speaker. We
37. John Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 30.
38. As he does elsewhere: 2.1.90–98 (PG 37:1445–51) and by details in 2.1.11.
39. Also of temporal import in the poem: βίος (lines 4, 29) is the earthly, and hence
temporally constrained, contrast for eternal life, ζώη; τέλος also has connotations of
death, the boundary between temporal and a-temporal life.
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cannot deny the possibility of identifying the poet and speaker as Gregory
on evidence external to the text and consequently to assume his identity
and experience within a shared network and background that provide the
poem with meaning, but there is nothing in the text per se that commits
an audience to this exact personal identification for the act to be a success.
That success, or “felicity,” is dependent upon the performance of that
act in accordance with known conventions and it is this emphasis on conventional context that Searle refines in his theories of network and background.40 Along these same lines, Simone Lecointre, in the introductory
article of Le Serment, responds to arguments that an oath is primarily an
oral rite that accompanies an objective act; in the process, she points to the
fundamental need to consider conventions or contexts. Speech act theory,
she argues, has posed more problems to linguists and philosophers than it
has solved, and she brings to light three major problems encountered in
applying speech act theory to oaths.41 Her third and final point concerns
the “extra-linguistic” elements of a speech act, “la distinction austinienne
entre l’acte proprement dit et ses conditions de réussite.”42 She offers this
preliminary conclusion:
Sans l’histoire, l’ethnologie, et plus généralement les sciences humaines,
le linguiste et le philosophe sont condamnés à n’aller, contrairement à ce
qu’espérait Austin, guère plus loin que les mots. Si le réel référentiel n’est
pas pris en charge, on se trouve réduit à une psycholinguistique du serment,
dont les effets empiriques ne seront pas plus définis que ne pourront l’être
ses fonctions véritables.43

She offers the possibility of thinking of oaths as “une modalité de l’engage
ment”; they establish nothing, announce nothing in themselves, but pres40. See his Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 141–59 on background; and Consciousness and
Language, 196ff. on network.
41. The first two are less relevant here: the first concerns a pragmatic linguistic
approach, namely the elliptical nature of the formula. In the statement “I swear by
the Logos,” uttering τὸν Λόγον comprises the act of swearing: “the Logos” is both the
object on which one swears and the “puissance qui préside au châtiment” (Lecointre,
“‘Ma langue prêta serment,’” 12). Lecointre summarizes the syllogistic system of the
oath formula: “L’affirmation solennelle, sacralisée, de l’auto-malédiction conditionelle, par le jeu du syllogisme, glisse et se retrouve dans la conclusion, qui devient
à son tour affirmation solennelle de non-culpabilité” (Lecointre, “‘Ma langue prêta
serment,’”13). Her second point concerns the incorporation of gestures, which are
necessary components in the success of a speech act, and the difficulty of formulating
a cross-cultural theory given the spectrum of gestures.
42. Lecointre, “‘Ma langue prêta serment,’” 17.
43. Lecointre, “‘Ma langue prêta serment,’” 21.

REBILLARD / SPEECH ACT OF SWEARING    191

ent the risk of sanction to which the swearer exposes himself. As such,
the point of 2.1.2 would be not necessarily the details of the content, but
the fact of the swearer’s relationship with the Logos. The words of the
oath are potential; they are not a speech act when divorced from a context
of utterance. If we are to make sense of Poema 2.1.2 as a speech act, we
need to discover contexts with which such an oath must engage to have
meaning—a world it fits and/or would fit to itself.
The poem abides by the formal elements of an oath with its tripartite
structure; but it also requires a community of witnesses for felicity as a
commissive speech act.44 In the opening lines of 2.1.2, the Logos is called
upon with numerous appellations that assert a particular Christological
doctrine, but the identification of witnesses provides a better key than
discussions of doctrine for understanding the poem relative to Gregory.
Gregory sent some of his work back to Constantinople after 381, and
critiques of bishops from that period were for the eyes and ears of those
criticized.45 The intended witnesses for the commissive in 2.1.2 about his
own episcopal performance may likely have been his episcopal colleagues—
those before whom he attempted to rehabilitate himself and whose behavior he critiques and would shape, just as he does in 2.1.12, for example.46
Thus for Gregory after 381, 2.1.2’s oath would be infelicitous because
despite the correct semantic formulae and format, these episcopal witnesses are absent upon its utterance.47 Gregory elsewhere in his post-381
works makes much of a written text being a replacement for face-to-face
communication, particularly in regard to his opportunity to preach.48 In

44. Rudhardt, Notions fondamentales, 208. Cf. Basil of Caesarea, Ep. 188.10 on
perjury (ed. and trans. Roy Deferrari, Saint Basil, The Letters, 4 vols., Loeb Classical Library 190, 215, 243, 270 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926–
34], 3:38–43), where he writes: “the form of an oath, its words, and the disposition
under which it was taken, and the subtle additions in the words” should weigh on
the swearer. It is striking how this prefigures Austin and Searle.
45. See Elm, “A Programmatic Life,” 17–20 on his willingness to criticize his
opponents.
46. See Storin, “In a Silent Way,” passim, but esp. 235–41.
47. Gregory writes in 1.2.24.245–47 (PG 37:807) that something written is even
more binding than an oath sworn: Β. Εἰ δ’ ἐγγράφοι τις, ὅρκον οὐκ ὀμωμοκώς; / Α. Τί
οὖν τὸ γράμμα βούλεται; / Χειρόγραφον δὲ τῶν δεσμῶν δεσμεῖ πλέον; Note, however,
that he makes a distinction between swearing an oath and writing, implying that an
oath is oral—a speech act.
48. See Gautier, Retraite et sacerdoce, 169–213, on the relationship between written and oral communication, also related to Gregory’s attitude toward literature and
the meaning of silence; and McLynn on Gregory writing to the capital concerning his
successor there, Nectarius (“The Voice of Conscience,” 299–308).
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this case, however, writing cannot necessarily replace utterance. The infelicity, or even the possibility of infelicity, makes an important point: the
fact that he had to write the text of the oath down in retreat points to a
deterioration of the very community that should have provided context
and met the conventions demanded for its “felicity.”
But might we also see the performance of 2.1.2 as felicitous as an assertive with another community of witnesses? In Searle’s development of the
concept of intent, a speaker’s intention must function together with convention in determining felicity.49 The speaker must intend to both represent
and communicate, such that s/he has the intention to make an utterance
and the utterance is intended to communicate its conditions of satisfaction.
The speech act, therefore, can only have meaning when the speaker and
hearer(s) share network and background. If we posit Gregory’s community
in retreat as the witnesses, people who share the wider network and background, there is felicity and thus meaning is communicated. Moreover, to
reiterate the specific terms in the process of narration is a powerful statement of Gregory’s fidelity: why remind anyone of the oath unless he has
not yet perjured himself; but also, by the binding nature of oaths, in the
future he must be as faithful. The poem by communicating the intent to
swear indicates Gregory’s willingness to suffer potential sanction—in this
case, loss of the guardianship of Christ, not something he would ever put
at risk. The assumed continuity of his intent secures the felicity of the oath.
Any discussion of the oath’s felicity relative to Gregory is, of course,
speculation given the lack of definitive context identifying the speaker. And
if we remove Gregory of Nazianzus, identified as the conscious autobiographer? We can apply Derrida’s concept of “iterability,” elaborated in
the course of one of the most acrimonious debates in speech act theory.50

49. Intentionality: Searle, Intentionality, esp. 4–13, 180–96; and Consciousness
and Language, 142–55. Sandy Petrey (Speech Acts and Literary Theory [New York:
Routledge, 1990], 145) characterizes the two approaches as Searle’s “subjective intentionality” and Austin’s “collective conventions.”
50. The initial article is Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman, Glyph 1 (1977): 172–97 (repr. in Jacques Derrida,
Limited Inc, ed. Gerard Graff [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988],
1–23); responded to by Searle in “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida,”
Glyph 1 (1977): 198–208; then Derrida’s response, “Limited Inc a b c,” trans. Weber
and Mehlman, Glyph 2 (1977): 162–254 (repr. in Limited Inc, 29–107). Limited Inc,
111–54, also contains the detailed “Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion,” which
is comprised of Derrida’s responses to queries by Graff, intended not only to clarify
some of the difficulties of the preceding essays, but to explain what Derrida calls the
“violence” and “aggression” of “Limited Inc a b c.”
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Iterability severs the conventional ties of Searle’s intentionality. It would
allow Poema 2.1.2 the multiplicity of commissive functions that are discussed in the following section—as professional oath, oath of office, doctrinal loyalty oath, or judicial oath of self-defense. Judith Butler extends
Derrida’s iterability into what she calls “citationality,” to suggest contra
Searle that the subject of an utterance can change, such that an “‘act’ is
not a momentary happening, but a certain nexus of temporal horizons, the
condensation of an iterability that exceeds the moment.”51 This does not
mean that a farmer can swear the oath in 2.1.2 and have it make sense.52
The text is so constructed that there are three fundamental elements of the
context necessary for the statement to make sense: the speaker must be a
bishop, espouse the poem’s stated Christological/Trinitarian doctrine, and
intend to swear the oath. Precisely because Gregory did not provide his
own or any other specific details in the scene of swearing or in the individual elements of the self-cursing, the poem uttered by any doctrinally
correct bishop in any time or place with the intent to swear will be binding.
As Derrida warns in Sec, it is impossible to define simply and limit the
context for a performative. The numerous contexts available for analysis of Gregory’s Poema 2.1.2 and its oath defy classification. Though the
basic concern of the piece can be identified as the orthodox bishop and the
poem can be dated with some certainty to post-381, its value as historical evidence of oaths of consecration or as specific an event as Gregory’s
own consecration is questionable. Like many of the poemata de seipso, it
hovers between history, scriptural exegesis, orthodox teaching, devotion,
and a literary exercise, depending on the interpreter’s and/or performer’s
context(s). The piece by the arguments of Derrida and Butler is transferable. It consequently might be interpreted as a statement of what Gregory
would assert regarding his own behavior as a bishop past, present, and
future, in effect establishing him as a model bishop, but also/or as a binding text for other speakers. If it was so understood by his contemporaries,
the poem makes a strong statement, as is argued below, about a desire
for professional regulation of the episcopacy from within its own ranks.

51. On divorcing intent from the original subject, see Judith Butler, Excitable
Speech, A Politics of the Performative (London: Routledge, 1997), 14.
52. Unless, of course, the “great seat” can also refer to something other than the
episcopal throne and we reinterpret line 10 regarding the application of hands (thanks
to one of the anonymous readers for JECS for highlighting this distinction).
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Contexts for Swearing: Professional,
Magisterial, IMPERIAL LOYALTY, and Judicial OATHs
Why would a fourth-century bishop advertise swearing an oath? What type
of oath was it acceptable for a bishop—not only the author—to swear given
possible prohibitions in the New Testament? To answer these q
 uestions,
I begin with a discussion of Gregory’s attitude toward oath swearing,
and then consider the types of oath that may have informed his decision
to structure the poem this way. The compositional models I propose are
taken from cultural and biblical contexts; the poem is a hybrid, in which
professional, magisterial, imperial loyalty, and judicial oaths all provide
productive interpretive models and/or a context for the author’s conception of oaths, both in Gregory’s biographical context and as a speech act
performed by other subjects.53
Gregory’s attitude toward swearing is not consistent. He uses it as a
literary device in a number of his epigrams collected in the Greek Anthology, book 8. For example, as speaker/poet he swears (or claims to have
sworn): “by the power of eternal God who ruleth on high and by the
souls of the dead and thy dust”; by Dikê and the dead; and “by Tartarus
itself.”54 These literary conceits follow in a classical tradition of funereal
epigrams in which the poet speaking as the dead curses looters of his tomb
or swears to his own respect for other dead during his lifetime in hopes of
ensuring the security of his resting place and monument.55
Gregory does not absolutely prohibit swearing, despite James 5.12 or,
possibly, Matthew 5.23ff,56 and in this practical approach resembles his
53. None of the literary oaths that I examined from the database of classical literary oaths compiled by Alan H. Sommerstein, Andrew Bayliss, and Isabelle Torrance
(http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~brzoaths/database [May 23, 2011]) or elsewhere
(excluding scripture), bears close enough resemblance to 2.1.2 to suggest allusion.
54. Nos. 114, 117, 248 (Paton, 2:450–51, 502–3). See also nos. 2, 192, 253 (Paton,
2:400–401, 484–85, 504–5).
55. Richmond Lattimore, Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962), 106–18. On gravestone curses, see J. H. M. Strubbe,
“‘Cursed be he that moves my bones,’” in Magika Hiera: Ancient Greek Magic and
Religion, ed. Christopher Faraone and Dirk Obbink (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991), 33–59.
56. Differing views on the level of prohibition in the Matthew passage: Rudolf
Hirzel, Der Eid, ein Beitrag zu seiner Geschichte (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1902), 109–23;
Dennis Duling, “‘[Do not swear. . .] by Jerusalem Because it is the City of the Great
King’ (Matt 5.35),” JBL 110:2 (1991): 291–309; Don Garlington, “Oath-Taking in
the Community of the New Age (Matthew 5.33–37),” Trinity Journal 16:2 (1995):
139–70; Bernard Kollmann, “Das Schwurverbot Mt 5.22–37/Jak 5.12 im Spiegel
antiker Eidkritik,” Biblische Zeitschrift n.F. 40:2 (1996): 179–93; Jo-Ann A. Brant,
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contemporaries.57 He warns against excessive swearing, dedicating one
of his Carmina moralia to a philosophical dialogue proving the illogic of
becoming a serial swearer, πολύορκος.58 Other patristic authors call upon
biblical examples such as Jepthah and Herod to emphasize similarly the
problems of rash swearing, but also without absolute prohibitions.59 Potential bishops, according to Basil, Socrates, and Sozomen, even swear oaths
not to accept sees under various conditions.60 What is frequently at issue
is the paramount importance of avoiding perjury and always being able to
assume the truth.61 Though Gregory makes no explicit statement regarding Old Testament versus New Testament attitudes toward swearing, he
recognizes that among Christians the truth is not always told—even in
oaths. He thus advises primarily against becoming a perjurer rather than
against swearing oaths: refraining completely from swearing is a remedy,
φάρμακον, against falsity in oaths.62

“Infelicitous Oaths in the Gospel of Matthew,” JSNT 63 (1996): 3–20, using speech
act theory; Marc Philonenko, “Prêter serment par le trône de Dieu (à propos de
Matthieu 5.34),” in Le Trône de Dieu, ed. Marc Philonenko, Wissenschaftliche

Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 69 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1993), 250 (243–51);
J. W. Roberts, “Some Notes on Swearing,” Restoration Quarterly 4:1 (1960): 30–34.
57. See Uhalde, Expectations of Justice, 77–104.
58. 1.2.24 (PG 37:790–813).
59. E.g. Athanasius (Expositiones in psalmos [PG 27:280.43]) and Basil of Caesarea (Homilia in psalmos [PG 29:260–62]) both assent to the Psalmist’s acceptance
of oaths in Psalm 62.12.
60. Basil (Ep. 188.10 [Deferrari, 3:38–43]) writes that one should not force monks
into the episcopate once they have sworn not to be ordained in order that they not
be forced into perjury. Cf. Soc. HE 1.38, 5.21 (GCS n.F. 1:88–90, 295–97); and also
note 6.6 (GCS n.F. 1:317–22), where it is not a problem for the emperor to swear
even in church. Sozomen records in HE 4.24; 7.3 and 11 (ed. Joseph Bidez and Günther Christian Hansen, Sozomenus, Kirchengeschichte, GCS n.F. 4, 2nd ed. [Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 1995]: 178–81, 304, 314) that Flavian swore then broke the communal oath not to be ordained until Meletius and Paulinus had both died. At 2.16
(GCS n.F. 4:58), oaths are sworn by the clergy in Alexandria to elect a bishop by
vote, an oath broken with the elevation of Athanasius. The multiplicity of swearing
bishops and priests more than suggests such behavior could be assumed believable
by a late antique audience.
61. But cf. Garlington, “New Age,” esp. 163–65; and Schneider in TWNT 5: 181–
82, on James 5.12, arguing swearing is inexcusable, only required when truthfulness
cannot be assumed as the norm.
62. 1.2.25, “Against Anger” (PG 37:813–51; on perjury, 835.6). See the commentary on 1.2.25.313 by Michael Oberhaus, ed. and trans., Gregor von Nazianz, Gegen
den Zorn (Carmen 1.2.25), Einleitung und Kommentar, Studien zur Geschichte und
Kultur des Altertums, 2. Reihe, Forschungen zu Gregor von Nazianz, n.F. 8 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1991), 131.
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Despite the danger of perjury, Gregory argues in Epistle 163 that swearing does have its place and is apparently necessary at times: sworn words
create an indissoluble bond over which no earthly court, ecclesiastical or
otherwise, has jurisdiction: “an oath in my opinion is the assurance of
the one putting forth the question and the one being prevailed upon.”63 In
this letter he responds to a bishop Theodore regarding a certain George,
who was seeking release from his oath before Theodore on the grounds
of constraint and that his oath was written not oral.64 Gregory advises
Theodore to inform George that he must accept responsibility for having
broken his oath—not only by his actions, but also by bringing the issue
before his bishop for judgment—and is to “shed secret tears” before God
and his bishop. Gregory does not allow for extenuating circumstances: by
their mutual acceptance of the terms of an oath, be it spoken or written,
men permanently unite themselves to one another in sight of the divine,
hence the irrelevance and impropriety of the arbitration of the bishop.65
The question of whether George’s initial swearing was or was not appropriate is moot; to break an oath once sworn is to dissolve the strongest
bond uniting men, simultaneously melting the divine glue of society. An
oath is not only the assurance of truth, but also, because it is sworn by
God as witness, an affirmation of the power of the divine in human interaction; to perjure is to be impious.66
When the speaker presents himself as having sworn in Poema 2.1.2, it
is the Logos, and one might speculate to what extent also “the Truth,”67
whom he calls upon to witness his oath: an absolute proof of his sincerity and hence doubly of his piety and righteousness. Beyond 2.1.2 (and
disregarding the swearing poses in the epigrams), Gregory admits to few
“oaths” of his own after baptism. He claims to have sworn an oath in
63. Ep. 163.4 (Gallay, 2:53).
64. An interesting argument from our legal perspective in which the written is no
less binding than the oral, and harder evidence that the agreement was made, as comes
to be the case in the CJ 2.55.4. For another example, see Neil McLynn’s discussion
of Ep. 112–14 in his “Curiales into Churchmen: The Case of Gregory Nazianzen,”
in Le trasformazioni delle élites in età tardoantica, Atti del convegno internazionale,
Perugia, 15–16 marzo, 2004, ed. Rita Lizzi Testa (Rome: ‘L’Erma’ di Bretschneider,
2006; repr. in Neil McLynn, Christian Politics and Religious Culture in Late Antiquity, Variorum Collected Series [Farnham: Ashgate, 2009], IX, 282–83).
65. The advice also puts him in an excellent position, like Augustine according to
Jill Harries (Law and Empire in Late Antiquity [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 181) for avoiding a request to act as arbiter in the case.
66. Rudhardt, Notions fondamentales, 209, 202–12 on oaths.
67. Cf. 2.1.25.1–2 (PG 37:1285): “I was false before you, you the Truth, Logos, /
in consecrating this day to you.”
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2.1.26.5, though the poem is a prayer with no contextual specifics or indication that the audience need identify the speaker as Gregory.68 He writes
in De vita sua that having decided to retire as bishop of Constantinople,
he feared a riot would ensue should he fail to promise to remain in the
city: “I swore an oath, but not as such (for I have not been bound by an
oath—if I, too, may boast a little in God—since I was washed by the grace
of the Spirit); I rather gave my word, trustworthy because of my character,
that I would remain until some of the other bishops appeared.”69 Gregory
is cautious, offering a proactive self-defense against charges of rash swearing by redefining his action as giving his word, which is supported by his
character, rather than swearing an oath, which is witnessed by God.70 He
removes himself from the threat of divine retribution for perjury. Yet if
we hear his voice in poem 2.1.2, reading it as an assertive, he is not only
claiming to have sworn, but even narrating the terms of a formal oath
sworn once he was bishop, clearly after he was “washed by the grace of
the Spirit” in baptism, all while calling upon the Logos as witness. Certainly 2.1.2 might be a literary exercise like the funereal epigrams, hence
not an outright contradiction of his statement in De vita sua. Even so, if
so much is at risk in swearing that he must redefine his “oath” in De vita
sua, what was at stake in Poema 2.1.2 that would make it worth taking
the risk of proclaiming an oath? There were many situations in which
an oath was acceptable and even normal for fourth-century Christians,
including reinforcing bonds between men within the Church hierarchy as
did the priest Aurelius Besis to his bishop Ammonotheon in the papyrus
mentioned above. These situations encompass, broadly defined, professional, magisterial, imperial loyalty, and judicial oaths, the latter linked
to biblical models.

Professional Oaths: The Hippocratic Model
The Hippocratic oath is an obvious example and a reasonable possibility as
a professional model. Though we do not know exactly what form it took
in the fourth century, it was commonly known and was certainly sworn in
Alexandria.71 Gregory was aware of it, writing in the funeral oration for
68. 2.1.26.4–5 (PG 37:1286.1–2): “Be mindful of yourself; do not forget to behold
God. / You have sworn an oath; remember your salvation.”
69. 2.1.11.1097–107 (Jungck: 106–8).
70. As per Jungck, De vita sua, 177: “Die eidlichen Beteuerungen in seinen Schriften
hat Gregor offenbar nicht als Eide empfunden.”
71. See David Leith, “The Hippocratic Oath in Antiquity and on Papyrus,” in
Zwischen Magie und Wissenschaft: Ärtze und Heilkunst in den Papyri aus Ägypten,
ed. Harald Froschauer and Cornelia Römer, Beiträge und Katalog einer Ausstellung
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his brother Caesarius that the latter refused to swear it.72 Gregory appears
to have had some knowledge of the medical profession, but if it was more
extensive than the average educated fourth-century aristocrat, and if so,
whether it came from his own research or through his brother, is not clear.
Though he presents himself more often as the patient than the physician,
he makes use of the common image of Christ as the physician of the soul
as a model for the priest.73 Carlos Galvão-Sobrinho, in an article on the
use of the Hippocratic oath in the medieval period, argues, using Jerome’s
advice to priests as evidence, that the novelty of the Christian use of the
oath in late antiquity was “its use as ‘non-oath,’ as a literary artifact, a
source of ancient wisdom to be exploited for various purposes.”74 There
is little similarity in content between the Hippocratic oath, at least in the
versions we have, and the oath in 2.1.2, thus Gregory does not appear
to echo it like Jerome.75 But is he using it as a literary artifact in another
way—as a formulaic type? In swearing an oath that can be definitively
associated with the bishop’s role, the poem’s speaker—Gregory or other—
might be likened to a doctor swearing the Hippocratic oath: becoming a
physician of souls in a very formal sense.
Heinrich von Staden has addressed the question of the relationship
between professional and private conduct in the Hippocratic oath. Βίος in
the oath, in von Staden’s interpretation, “is used in the primary classical
sense of the Greek word . . . that is, to signify ‘mode of life’ or the ‘manner
of living one’s life,’ that is, the ways in which a person shapes the series of
voluntary activities and the responses to involuntary experiences, which
make up his or her history.”76 Gregory also refers to his oath in 2.1.2.29
as establishing the laws by which he bound his βίος, which can similarly
der österreichischen Nationalbibliothek (Wien: Phoibos, 2007), 35–42; Owsei Temkin,
Hippocrates in a World of Pagans and Christians (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1991), 181–83, 241–48; and Carlos R. Galvão-Sobrinho, “Hippocratic Ideals, Medical Ethics, and the Practice of Medicine in the Early Middle Ages:
The Legacy of the Hippocratic Oath,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied
Sciences 51 (1996): 438–55, 438–42 on late antiquity.
72. The fact that Gregory emphasizes Caesarius’s refusal to swear as an example
of the latter’s Christian rigor suggests that the stance was somewhat unusual (Or.
7.10 [SC 405:202–7]). See Temkin, Hippocrates, 182n8.
73. See his Or. 2 (SC 247), and Elm’s analysis of it in “Diagnostic Gaze,” 93–95;
also, Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity, 242–47.
74. Galvão-Sobrinho, “Hippocratic Ideals,” 442.
75. Heinrich Von Staden, “‘In a Pure and Holy Way’: Personal and Professional
Conduct in the Hippocratic Oath,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied
Sciences 51 (1996): 404–37.
76. Von Staden, “‘In a Pure and Holy Way,’” 420.
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refer to both his personal and ecclesiastic behavior given the references
to general Christian behavior and episcopal responsibilities within the
fourteen elements of the self-curse. Von Staden concludes that in the Hippocratic oath, “the professional and the personal, the public and the private, the religious and the secular are, it seems, comprehensively covered
by the same sworn commitment to preserve them unremittingly ‘in a pure
and holy way’ . . . the Oath . . . pledges to submit both all of ‘life’ and all
of the medical ‘profession’ to the same moral and religious restraints.”77
This interpretation offers a fruitful model for reading 2.1.2 as a professional oath for bishops. If it is understood as such, Christ as physician is
not the only example for bishops in the execution of the duties required
by his ecclesiastic position; the earthly physician who swears by divine
powers to proper behavior in all spheres of life as part of his professional
code of conduct also provides a standard for emulation, not least for his
relationship with the divine as it is broadcast by the oath.78 Von Staden’s
interpretation of the Hippocratic oath echoes the simultaneously public
and private description of a proper bishop that is put forth in Titus and
1 Timothy, as well as Gregory’s own comments throughout his corpus,
particularly in 2.1.12 and his criticisms of Maximus the Cynic on the ideal
nature of a bishop: there is no line between public and private behavior
for a church leader.79 Despite his laments over the professionalization of
positions in the Church in works composed after his retreat from Constantinople, 2.1.2 mirrors the physicians’ profession in the episcopate,
perhaps offering bishops an oath of professional standards equivalent to
the physicians’.80
77. Von Staden, “‘In a Pure and Holy Way,’” 434. On the interrelation between
professional, social, and spiritual spheres, see McLynn, “Curiales into Churchmen,”
282–88.
78. A reality reflected in the structure of the oath: see Von Staden, “‘In a Pure and
Holy Way,’” 434: “As elsewhere, structure here too is a bearer of meaning: present
at the beginning, middle and end of the Oath, the gods not only guarantee the binding force and hence the efficacy of the oath. . . .”
79. Contra Maximus: 2.1.41 (PG 37:1339–44), Or. 25 (SC 284); see Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity, 242–54 on Gregory’s treatment of the priesthood as
a profession and “pastoral ministry as a professional skill based on a discrete body
of knowledge” (247).
80. See Claudia Rapp, Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity: The Nature of Christian
Leadership in an Age of Transition, Transformation of the Classical Heritage 37 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 172–207, on the social contexts from
which bishops came and the professionalism of the episcopate; also Sabine Hübner,
Der Klerus in der Gesellschaft des spätantiken Kleinasiens, Altertumswissenschaftliches
Kolloquium 15 (Munich: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005), passim for social background
of clerics. On the problems with professionalization from Gregory’s perspective, see
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Magisterial and Imperial Loyalty Oaths
Magisterial oaths also offer compositional and interpretive models for
2.1.2, particularly in the latter’s list of νόμοι (or ὅροι, as in the manuscript
titles) like a code of ethics while holding episcopal office. Their presence in
the background could reflect the increasingly formalized, and even legalized, selection processes for bishops noted in recent scholarship.81 Gregory’s
use of civic documents as compositional frameworks has been established
by Susanna Elm. She argues that Gregory’s Oration 42, his “Farewell
to the Bishops” (dated to 381), can be read as a certificate of discharge
from office, in which Gregory must justify like a departing magistrate his
behavior as bishop of Constantinople.82 Given the concern in 2.1.2 with
proper behavior while holding a see—and even perhaps with proper ordination—one might see behind it such a civic oath of office.83 The bishop’s
bonds, however, are not limited to a “term of office” even for a bishop
like Gregory who migrated among sees. Like the physician’s oath, they
entail a lifelong commitment and are inseparable from his wider βίος. The
publication of such an oath of office by Gregory about himself suggests
that even despite charges of anti-canonical movements and accusations
of misuse of funds,84 he is conscious of his accountability before God for

McLynn, “The Voice of Conscience,” 306–8. For another example of Gregory’s complaints on the current episcopate, see Or. 18.15, 35 (PG 35:1004, 1022).
81. See Van Nuffelen, “Episcopal Succession,” 449–51, with its critique of Peter
Norton, Episcopal Elections 250–600, Hierarchy and Popular Will in Late Antiquity,
Oxford Classical Monograph Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), especially 18–51; Bradshaw, Ordination Rites, 21–25, for increasingly formalized liturgical developments; and cf. Georg Schöllgen, Die Anfänge der Professionalisierung des
Klerus und das kirchliche Amt in der syrischen Didaskalie, JAC Ergänzungsband 26
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1998).
82. Elm, “Inventing the ‘Father of the Church,’” 10–13. Cf. Rapp, Holy Bishops,
169–71, on shared language of praise for bishops and civic authorities.
83. Most evidence is earlier (see Wolfgang Kunkel and Roland Wittmann, Die
Magistratur, 2nd ed., Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, Abt. 10: Rechtsgeschichte
des Altertums, Teil 3, Bd. 2: Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der römischen Republik
[Munich: Beck, 1995], 93–96; 93–94 on entering office [iusiurandum in leges]; 253–54
on leaving office; 96 on before the quaestor; and 228 on soldiers). We do have magisterial oaths from Justinian’s Novel 8, a reinstitution, but it is not clear where and
when the practice of magisterial oaths lapsed, allowing for Justinianic reinstitution;
see Charles Pazdernik, “‘The Trembling of Cain’: Religious Power and Institutional
Culture in Justinianic Oath-Making,” in The Power of Religion in Late Antiquity, ed.
Andrew Cain and Noel Lensky (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 143–54, esp. 149ff on
Justinianic magistrates’ oaths of office following on those of Theodosius II and Valentinian III for provincial governors, and their swearing to have rightfully achieved office.
84. See Elm, “Inventing the ‘Father of the Church,’” 13–16.
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his behavior “in office.” Read as an assertive, the reiteration upon departure of the precise oath sworn on entering office is a strong statement of
fidelity to it. Understood as a commissive, Gregory swears before Christ
on leaving the “office,” or at least the trappings of it in Constantinople,
that he has executed his office legally and properly, but as such, the text
could be transferable to any episcopal “office holder.”
The oath most frequently found in evidence from the Roman period is
the imperial loyalty oath, particularly in its function as guarantee for the
truth of documents submitted to the authorities,85 though there are extant
inscriptions from across the empire of its other uses.86 We have no fourthcentury Cappadocian version preserved, but Poema 2.1.2 exhibits similarities to some of the few inscribed loyalty oaths extant,87 notably from
Roman Asia Minor.88 In the opening phrase of 2.1.2, the oath is taken on
85. Clifford Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire,
Classics and Contemporary Thought 6 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
2000), 359. The loyalty oath used as a liability oath is referred to on P.Mich. 5838
as the “customary oath of the Romans” (Pieter J. Sijpesteijn, “Mutilated Texts from
the Michigan Papyrus Collection,” Aegyptus 76 [1996]: 30–31; see also Kate Cooper,
“Christianity, Private Power, and the Law from Decius to Constantine: The Minimalist View,” JECS 19:3 [2011]: 340n30). For its formulae, see Roger Bagnall and K. A.
Worp, Regnal Formulas in Byzantine Egypt (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979);
K. A. Worp, “Byzantine Imperial Titulature in the Greek Documentary Papyri: The
Oath Formulas,” ZPE 45 (1982): 199–225; Z. M. Packman, “Notes on Papyrus Texts
with the Roman Imperial Oath,” ZPE 89 (1991): 91–102; Z. M. Packman, “Further
Notes on Texts with the Imperial Oath,” ZPE 90 (1992): 258; and Packman, “Still
Further Notes,” 208–10.
86. For texts: Peter Herrmann, Der römische Kaisereid, Untersuchungen zu seiner
Herkunft und Entwicklung, Hypomnemata, Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem
Nachleben 20 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968); for brief analysis: Hubert
Cancik, “Der Kaiser-Eid, zur Praxis der römischen Herrscherverehrung,” in Die Praxis
der Herrscherverehrung in Rom und seinen Provinzen, ed. Hubert Cancik and Konrad Hitzl (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 29–45.
87. Packman, “Still Further Notes,” 207. As is evident from most of the texts
provided by Packman, the verb of swearing in these oaths is generally in the present,
not the aorist, though see page 208 on P.Cair.Masp.II 156 for an aorist in a sixthcentury fragment.
88. One can also speculate about military oaths of loyalty, but there is nothing specific in the language to indicate it would be the soldier’s oath rather than or as well
as the citizen oath that served as model here. On soldiers swearing the loyalty oath
into late antiquity, see J. E. Lendon, Empire of Honour, The Art of Government in
the Roman World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 12, 253; also A. D. Lee, War in
Late Antiquity, A Social History, Ancient World at War (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 177, 184. The summary of the sacramentum provided by Vegetius 2.5
(ed. Michael Reeve, Vegetius, Epitoma rei militaris [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004],
38–39) could perhaps offer a model in the vow to never desert the service (numquam
deserturos militam) for the poem’s promise not to stray from the Trinity (2.1.2.5–6).
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the Logos himself, τὸν Λόγον αὐτὸν, the pronoun echoing the naming of the
emperor in the invocations of loyalty oaths such as from Neoclaudiopolis
in Paphlagonia dating to the early imperial period: “I swear by God, Earth,
the Sun, all the gods and goddesses, and the holy emperor himself (αὐτὸν)
to be well-minded (εὐνοήσειν) to venerable Caesar and to his children and
descendants, for all time . . . in word and deed and thought (γνώμῃ).”89
The phrase in italics bears some resemblance to the alien mind and word
mentioned in the third couplet of the poem.
The greatest number of surviving texts of late antique Greek loyalty
oaths come from Egyptian papyri, documents submitted to officials that
close with a liability clause stating that the party is bound by having sworn
loyalty to the emperor: person X submits document Y, “being bound by
the holy oath.”90 The closing couplet of 2.1.2, where the poet claims, “by
these laws (νόμοισιν) I have bound my existence,” is typical of any formal
oath, but might be read more specifically as such a liability clause.91 After
350 invocations of the emperor in imperial loyalty oaths became more
elaborate: the emperors are referred to effusively by name and titulature,
no longer simply by a short form of title—similar to the multiple appellations of Christ in the opening lines of 2.1.2.92 Taking this contemporary
expansion in combination with viewing the imperial loyalty oath as a
compositional model for Gregory, the poem might be read as a powerful political statement: the emperor as guarantor and object of loyalty is
replaced by Christ. It is also worth noting the initial description of the
Logos relative to the speaker (ὅ μοι Θεός ἐστι μέγιστος), which is reminiscent
of the consistent reference to emperors as “ours” (ἡμῶν) in the imperial
titulature of loyalty oaths.93 When we consider this possible influence in
light of the assumption that the poem is a response to Gregory’s departure
from Constantinople, the poem as a loyalty oath asserts that Gregory’s
89. My translation, based on the Greek text in Herrmann, Der römische Kaisereid, 123–24.
90. Packman, “Still Further Notes,” 208–9.
91. Though ἔνοχος is the more common formulation (see Packman, “Still Further
Notes,” 208–9). Similar, though from 24 CE and sworn on the emperor Tiberius, are
the oaths of sluice guards recorded on P.Mich.inv.645 (APIS 2836), also an example
of a professional oath: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/i/image/image-idx?id=S-APIS-X
-2836%5D645R.TIF (May 2, 2011).
92. Packman, “Notes on Papyrus Texts,” 95; see also, for the Trinity or God named
before the emperor, Hauben, “On the Invocation,” passim. The multiple appellations also recall those of God in the prayer that opens the consecration ceremony on
ApostConst 8.5 (Metzger, 3:144–48).
93. Cf. Z. M. Packman, “Regnal Formulas in Document Date and in the Imperial
Oath,” ZPE 91 (1992): 61–76.
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loyalty in the wake of his experiences in the capital is to Christ and the
supporters of Gregory’s own Christology—emphatically not to the imperial will.94 Yet also, outside the context of Gregory’s own biography, the
poem/oath could serve as a corrective for a doctrinally divided episcopacy
of his or any period.

Judicial Oaths
In the litigious climate of the later Roman Empire, we can also turn to
judicial oaths as models, though our evidence here is earlier and later, as
with oaths of office, not contemporary. Swearing had a variety of functions
within the state’s court system. For example, witnesses and parties swore
to the truth of their statements.95 Gaius’s Institutes states that the praetor
could demand parties swear an oath “non calumniae causa infitias ire.”96 In
the Codex Iustinianus, judges are to swear an oath as to their impartiality,
though rather like an oath of office than singularly before each case.97 Proceedings themselves were frequently the result of the breaking of a promissory oath. When one moves outside the court system into the ancillary
system of arbitration, bishops, including Gregory, played the dominant
role and we can assume familiarity on their part with legal oaths.98 The
arbitration process began typically with the drafting of a compromissum,
a document identifying the parties involved and the details of the issue to
be resolved, as well as the proposed settlement. The parties’ agreement
to adhere to the decision of the arbiter as specified in the compromissum
was guaranteed either by the inclusion of a penalty or by oath.99 There is
94. On swearing loyalty to a doctrinal party, see Athanasius, De Synodis 3.37 (PG
26:757–60), and Sozomen HE 2.27, 7.21 (GCS n.F. 4:88–90, 333–34). Later historians such as Sozomen reinforce Gregory’s claims of support from the emperor (and
are followed by, e.g., Norton, Episcopal Elections, 30–31), but these later accounts
may themselves be based primarily on Gregory’s own accounts; see the criticisms in
McLynn, “Moment of Truth,” 218–31.
95. CJ 4.1.12. On oaths in court see Erwin Seidl, Römische Rechtsgeschichte und
römisches Zivilprozessrecht, Grundrisse der Rechtswissenschaft (Hannover: Wissenschaftliche Verlagsanstalt, 1949), 125–27.
96. Institutes 4.172; 4.172–87 (ed. Ulrich Manthe, Gaius Institutiones / Die Institutionen des Gaius, Texte zur Forschung 81 [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004]: 412–16); on calumnia, see Uhalde, Expectations of Justice, 16–43.
97. CJ 3.1.14; Seidl, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 109; Max Kaser, Das Römische
Zivilprozessrecht, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, Teil 3, Band 4: Rechtsgeschichte des Altertums (Munich: C. H. Beck’s Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966).
98. On the state of scholarship regarding audientia, see Caroline Humfress, “
 Bishops
and Law Courts in Late Antiquity: How (Not) to Make Sense of the Legal Evidence,”
JECS 19:3 (2011): 375–400.
99. See Harries, Law and Empire, 176ff.
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evidence of oaths taking the place of an audientia episcopalis: Jill Harries
points to Augustine’s redirecting two priests to swear oaths at the shrine
of Felix at Nola, a truth test for resolution of their dispute, as an example
of a matter too delicate for the bishop to handle himself.100
These legal contexts provide a frame in which we might interpret the
choice of form for Poema 2.1.2. Seen from a legal perspective, 2.1.2, on
the one hand, as a record of a sworn oath, can be looked at as an assertive
oath, a proof, like those of court case participants, sworn on the Logos
that the speaker has in fact adhered to the terms of the oath reported in
the poem. It is thus formal and legally binding evidence of the speaker’s
righteousness and orthodoxy. On the other hand, taking the opening verb
as an aorist of swearing, the poem might as be regarded as a compromissum that assures the speaker will abide by the standards of behavior set out
in the poem and by the poem’s Christology. This leaves the final judgment
to Christ, making the poem a testament to Christ’s, or the Trinity’s, ultimate authority, the emphasis granted to oaths as speech acts by Lecointre.

Biblical Models
Judicial echoes in 2.1.2 resonate when the poem is read alongside Job 31,
an oath sworn by Job before his critics in defense of his own integrity.
There are various echoes in Gregory’s poem from the Old Testament passage, for example: walking the proper path,101 judging fairly,102 helping the
needy,103 and proper relations with enemies.104 Gregory frequently likens
himself to Job, even calling himself elsewhere “another Job” but for different reasons.105 Like the Old Testament figure, Gregory endures seemingly
undeserved suffering; his oath is the justification of his righteousness that
will silence the arguments of his opponents, as Job’s did Eliphaz, Bildad,
and Zophar: “Job ceased from his words. And his three companions fell
silent in answering Job; for Job was righteous (δίκαιος) to them.”106 The

100. Harries, Law and Empire, 181.
101. Job 31.5, 7; 2.1.2.17–18.
102. Job 31.13; 2.1.2.15.
103. Job 31.16–21; 2.1.2.25.
104. Job 31.29–30; 2.1.2.23–24.
105. The comparison appears in 2.1.19.31 (Simelidis, Selected Poems, 110), a
poem written in response to his departure from Constantinople; see Simelidis, Selected
Poems, 190: “Job is mentioned thirty times in Gregory’s writings (seven in the poems),
usually as a model of wisdom and patience.”
106. Job 31.40–32.1. Cf. the Athenian practice of stopping litigation by swearing: Michael Gagarin, “Litigants’ Oaths in Greek Law,” in Sommerstein and Fletcher,
Horkos, 39–47.
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poet/speaker uses similar vocabulary in reference to himself: “if feigning
righteousness I should dispense a justice somehow skewed . . .” (Εἰ δὲ δίκην
δικάσαιμι παρακλίνας τι θέμιστος . . .).107 The language draws the audience
into a legal context and the similarities with the scene in Job 31 suggest
the speaker’s voice in the poem is that of a defendant, uttered in opposition to unidentified accusers.
Further Scriptural contexts are provided by the two New Testament
passages warning against oaths referred to above, James 4.10–12 and
Matthew 5.36. The former suggests Christians avoid swearing oaths by
becoming Job-like:
As an example of suffering and patience, brethren, take the prophets who
spoke in the name of the Lord. Behold, we call those happy who were
steadfast. You have heard of the steadfastness of Job, and you have seen
the purpose of the Lord, how the Lord is compassionate and merciful. But
above all, my brethren, do not swear, either by heaven or by earth or with
any other oath, but let your yes be yes and your no be no, that you may
not fall under condemnation.

Gregory directly counters this advice with his poem, an attitude witnessed
by the ambivalence toward swearing discussed at the opening of this section: he becomes like Job precisely by swearing. In addition, 2.1.2’s concluding promise (“may Christ attend another more gently, but as for my
efforts, / even up to my white hairs, may the breeze take them”) might
bring to mind Matthew 5.36, if the act of swearing itself has not done so
already: “And do not swear by your head, for you cannot make one hair
white or black.”108 The words for white are different—λευκός in Matthew,
πολιός in 2.1.2—though it is not unusual for Gregory to echo Scripture
using classical poetic vocabulary; the poem is clearly not using the image
in the same way; and the image of his white hairs as reference to his age
is not uncommon in Gregory; but in the context of swearing the white
hair does suggest to me a link, albeit tangential, between the poem and
the prohibition in Matthew. Reminders of New Testament prohibitions
increase the audience’s perception of the speaker’s voluntary peril in the
act of swearing. The greater the risk, the stronger is the audience’s impression of the speaker’s truthfulness and righteousness.
Despite all advice against swearing oaths, Christ is asked in Poema 2.1.2
to bear witness to three virtues of the speaker/bishop: his appropriate

107. 2.1.2.15.
108. 2.1.2.27–28. Crimi (Poesie/2, 67n3) suggests Gregory’s image is taken from
Euripides Troades, 454, but the latter has no mention of hair or color.
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professional conduct within and beyond circumscribed episcopal responsibilities; his loyalty to a particular party of Christological doctrine; and
his righteousness in the face of accusations. The oath format is heavily
weighted with secular associations that anchor the frame for understanding the bishop’s responsibilities and vulnerabilities in a decidedly mortal
sphere.109 The overlap of the models colors the portrait of the episcopate
as a profession. An oath sworn by a divine power, however, binds men to
the Trinity, and the professional, civic, and judicial oaths that are possible
compositional models for Poema 2.1.2 are all intended to beckon divinity
to oversee inter-human interaction. The scriptural resonances, moreover,
are indicative of the difficulties for a bishop in balancing divine directives
and human necessity. While the poem as an oath asserts its speaker’s bond
with the divine, the contexts provided by these models indicate that the
form, even if a last resort, is obliged by human weakness—and not only
Gregory’s. Yet as the author of the poem, it is his conception of the episcopate that serves as exemplar.
CONCLUSION
On its own Poema 2.1.2 cannot stand as an autobiography in the modern
sense. It is quite specifically—and perhaps even intentionally—devoid of
explicit details of context that we can identify with the historical figure of
Gregory of Nazianzus. Whatever voice of Gregory we might hear in it is
only ascribable to him in light of our readings in the wider extant corpus.
As such we can read the piece as either a commissive or assertive illocution,
a poem, probably written after 381, that presents Gregory of Nazianzus
swearing or claiming to have sworn at some time a binding oath to have
behaved and continue to behave properly as bishop. It can thus be read
as: a professional oath that binds his entire existence even after leaving the
capital; a loyalty oath and statement of his doctrinal fidelity; an oath of
legal fulfillment of his terms of office; and an oath of self defense in light
of charges he transgressed canon law. The poem can be seen as Gregory’s
statement of his own exemplary status as bishop, and/or of the dissolution of the doctrinally coherent body of bishops that should have born
witness to his swearing.
Yet Gregory’s tendency to write about his own life and times is not
enough to demand we read the poem solely as a conscious record of any

109. Though given Temkin’s arguments in Hippocrates, the Hippocratic oath had
been adapted to the specifically Christian world.

REBILLARD / SPEECH ACT OF SWEARING    207

oath of his own or even as referring to his own specific experiences of the
episcopate, nor does it demand that we perceive his intention in composition to be the creation of a historical record about those experiences. If
the poem is examined in isolation from the rest of his corpus and without
the assumptions that flow in the wake of the poem’s inclusion among the
Poemata de seipso, we can read it as a commissive illocution, and on the
grounds of Derrida’s iterability, the original author’s intent can then be
divorced from the text, allowing each bishop who utters its words in a
new context, though still in accordance with its doctrine, to perform the
act of swearing. The oath as act performed, as per Butler, shapes the episcopate in the time and place of each performance.
Poema 2.1.2’s uncertainties are what give it life in all its possible contexts. It is representative of the problems that arise in approaching some
of the lesser known, less-narrative pieces in the collection of Gregory’s
Poemata de seipso as autobiographies in whatever modern sense we conceive of the genre. These poems do reinforce what we know about “the
man” when read in the context of the other poems, the letters, and the
orations. Yet some, such as 2.1.24, 25, 26, 48 and 49,110 are like 2.1.2
de-contextualized. It is when they are so cleaved from their author that
we perceive an expansion of their potential as evidence of fourth-century
cultural contexts as well as for the applicability of our own approaches.
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